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Abstract A simplicial algorithm is developed to compute a robust sta-
tionary point of a continuous function on the Cartesian product S of
unit simplices. The concept of a robust stationary point is a refinement
of the concept of a statiunary point on S and coincides with the proper-
ness of a Nash c~uilibrium of a finite game when the function is defined
by the expected marginal payoff of the game. The algorithm and the
concept of a robust stationary point are generalizations for functions on
the unit simplex introduced in an earlier paper. Starting with an arbi-
trarily chosen interior point v in S, the algorithm generates a piecewise
linear path of points in S and terminates with an approximate robust
stationary point of any a priori chosen accuracy within a finite number
of steps. We apply the algorithm to find proper Nash equilibria of non-
cooperative finite games, where S is the strategy space. The path of
points generated by the algorithm admits a game-theoretically natural
interpretation. Some numerical examples are given.
Ifeywords: Robust stationary point, noncooperative game, proper equi-
librium, simplicial algorithm, piecewise linear approximation, triangu-
lation.
1 Introduction
Let S denote the Cartesian product of n unit simplices S"~ -{ x~ E Rf ~
~~'~ x~,k - 1}, j - 1,...,n. Suppose that f : S~---r r[;-, R"~ is a function. Then
the stationary point problem for f on S is to find a point ~' E S such that for every
j E { 1,...,n}
(~~ - ~iÍ~fi(x~~ ~ 0
íor any point x E S. We call x' a stationary point of f on S. It is well known
that this problem is equivalent to the Brouwer fixed point problem on S(see e.g.
Doup [3~~.
SThis reasearch is pazt of the VF-progtam "Competition and Cooperation".
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LE 'I'ilburg, 'Che Nr.therlands'1'o computc a fixed poinL or a statíooary point of a continuous function on
5', several sirnplicial algorithms have been developed (see van der Laan and Tal-
man [13], Doup and Talman [4]). In a simplicial subdivision of S, starting with
an arbitrary point. of S, such algorithms search for a simplex which contains an
approxirnate solution, by generating a sequence of adjacent simplices of varying
dimension. 1'he simplex with which the algorithm terminates is reached within a
finite numbcr of steps. These algorithms are generalizations of an algorithm ini-
tiated in van der Laarr and Talman [12] which could date back to the pioneering
work of Scarf [18]. I'or more details on the development of simplicial algorithms,
the reader rnay consult some excellent articles and books which include Todd [21],
llonp [:3], and Allguwer and Ceorg [1].
'I'he concept of a robust stationary point recently introduced in Yang [25] is a
rc(inenrent of the concept of a stationary point of a continuous function on the unit
simple~x. In this paper we generalize this concept to the Cartesian product S of
unit simplices and modify the algorithm in [25] to find a robust stationary point
of a continuuus function on S. In particular proper Nash equilibrirrm strategies of
noncooperative finite games, introduced by Myerson [16], can be computed in this
way, where S is the strategy space of the game. The proper Nash equilibria of a
garne coincide with the robust stationary points of the marginal expected payoff
funct,ion of the game. Moreover the path of points generated by the algorithm
adrnil.s a garnc-thcoretically natural interpretation. Wc remark that the algorithrn
can be also applied to find robust equilibria of other economic models, for example,
international t.rade models and general equilibrium models with increasing returns
to scale production (see Mansur and Whalley [15], and van der Laan [ll]).
Let us now give a brief survey on the development of the computation of Nash
c~qnilibria of finite garnes. 'Chere has been an extensive litcrature dcaling with this
problc,nr start.ing with Lemke and Ilowson [14]. In their paper they showed that a
binra.t.rix garnc~ can be solved by forrnulating it as a linear complementarity problern.
li.ose~nmiillc~r [17] and Wilson [22] furthcr independently discovered that N-person
games can bc~ formulated as a nonlinear complementarity problem. Based on fea-
tures of these nonconstructive methods Garcia, Lemke and Luthi [7] firstly proposed
a simplicial algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium of N-person games. Later a
nrore efficient simplicial algorithm was proposed in van der Laan and Talman [13].
A procedure to search for a perfect equilibrium of a bimatrix game was developed
by van den Elzen and '1'alman [6]. Wilson [`L'3] presented an algorithm to compute
simply stable equilibria of a bimatrix game.
In the development of our ideas we have been influenced by the exposition of the
procedure by Yamamoto [24] for the determination of a proper Nash equilibrium
of firríte garnes. However, the algorithm in this paper differs from Yamamoto's
procedure in the following aspects: In order to avoid confusion, we will denote the
procedure of Yamamoto by Y-procedure.3
(i) 'I'he 1'-procedurc, is a nonconsLructive met.hod, while the algorithrn is a con-
arucl.ive one in f.hc sense that an approximate proper equilibrium of any given
;c priuri chosc,n ac'c'uracy can bc, rcached wiLhin a finite numbcr of iLcrations.
(ii) 'I'hc, 1 ~~rocc~clurr c an unly sLart at t.hc Iraryccutcr of thc sLraLcgY spacc, whilc
Lhc alguriLhrn can start from any completely mixed strategy poinL rn the
strategy spac.e. 'I'hcrefore a priori information ( if available) about the location
of a solution can be used and more proper equilibtia (if any) could be found
by the algorithm. In this sense the algorithm can provide more insights to
analyze the structure of proper equilibria of games. For example, the structure
of thc set of proper equilibria in a bimatrix game is analysed by Jansen [S].
(iii) '['he Y-procedure is involved in solving nonlinear equation systems, while the
algorithm only needs to solve very simple linear equation systems. Since
dealing with nonlinear equation systems is generally intrinsically difficult (see
c.g. Allgower and Georg [1]), the latter method is decisively improving the
first one from a computationally theorectical point of view. As Wilson [23]
poinfs out: 'Studies of more realistic problems require an ef6cient algorithm.
An algoriLhm is also essential for empirical studies of the many game-theoretic
cnodels developed to study imperfectly competitive markets'.
(iv) '1'he algorithm can deal with any finite game no matter whether iL is de-
gcnerate or nondegenerate in the sense of Lemke-Howson or in the sense of
YamamoLo. In fact we do not make any assumption on finite games in the
paper.
(v) "Che algorithm is based on a specific simplicial subdivision and is easy to
implement on a computer.
'L'he remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
definition of a robust stationary point on the Cartesian product .S of unit simplices
and establish its relationship with the concept of a proper Nash equilibrium of a
noncooperative finite game. Section 3 specifies the simplicial subdivision of the set
S which underlies the algoriLhm. In Section 4 we give the path of points followed by
Lhe algorithm, prove the convergence of the algorithm under the assumption that
thc function f to be considered is continuous, and also derive the accuracy of an
aPProximatc robust stationary point. Section 5 describes the steps of the algorithm.
Sorne examples are given in Section 6.2 Proper Nash equilibria and robust stationary
points
'1'hc~ concept. of a proper equilibrium defined by Myerson [l6~ as a refinement of a
perfect Nash equilibrium, is probably one of the most important and elegant ideas
in garne theory. The aim of this section is to derive the relationship between the
concept of a robust stationary point and the concept of a proper Nash equilibrium
o( a finitc game. Let us first introduce the definition of a robust stationary point
on Ihc~ Cartcsian producL S- jj~-r S"' oí n unit simplices, whcrc S"~ -{ x~ E
~tt' I~h-r s~.h - I} is the (ni - 1)-dimensional unit simplex, j E{ 1, ..., n}. We
denot.c Lhe sct of integers { 1, ..., n} by I,,. I~urthermore, we denote ~~-r n~ by M
and an elemcnt x E S by x -(xi ;...; x,T, )T where x~ is an element of S"~, j E I,,.
Lef, a function f: S c-a RM be given.
Definition 2.1 !or yiven B 7 0 a point x E S is a B-roóust stationary point oJ
f if
(I) :r is a cr~lative inlerior point of S;
(:, ~~ xk; G Oxk,i tlÏk,~(z) C fk,i(x), for 1 C i, j G nk, k E I,,.
Definition 2.2 A poinl x' E S is a robust stationary point of f on S if lhere
exisl sequences { Bc }~r nnd { x(Oc) }~r ofBr-robust stntionary points x(t7r) of f such
llcal
lim Oc - 0 and lirn x(Br) - x`.
ry~ c~~
Observe that if a stationary point x' of f lies in the relative interior of S, then
x' must bc a robust stationary point of j. Some examples given in 5ection 6
will cle~monsl.rate that the concept, of a robust stationary point is indc:ed a proper
n~finc~nn~nt uf Lhe c~onc'c~pl. of a stationary point. Analogous t,o [25~, wc havc thc
followiuF n~sull.,.
Lemma 2.3 l,ct f: S H RM be a conlinuous function. If x' E S is a robust
slafianary poinl of f, lhen x' is also a stationary point of f.
Theorem 2.4 l,r.t f: S f----a RM br. a continuous function. Then f has at least
ona robusl stalionary point.
Now we briefly review Myerson's concept of a proper Nash equilibrium of a
finite game. A finite n-person game in strategic form is characterized by a 2n-tuple
I' -(~r, ... ,~n; Ur, ..., U„), where ~~ denotes a nonempty finite set and Ui is a
rcal-valued function defined on the domain ~- r[; r~: for j E I,,. We interpret1„ as thc set of playcrs. l~or each j E l,,, ~~ is the set of player j~s pure strategics
bcing inciexed by (j, 1), ... , (j,n~), and U~ is the payoff function of this player, i.c.
U,(ó) is thc payoff to player j when the strategy ~-((1, ji), (2, j2), ... , (n, j„)) E~
is such t.hat for i E I„ player i chooses action (i, j;) E~;. The set of all mixed
strategies of player j E!„ is the (n~ - 1)-dimensional unit simplex S"~ and the
rnixecí st.rategy space of the game is the Cartesian product S-]-j~-r S"~. Given a
rnixecí strategy x-(x~ ;.. . ; xn )T in S the probability that a pure strategy
~ - ((1,7r),(2,7x),...,(n,7n)) E ~
occurti is gívcn hy .r(~) -[j','-~ Tta~. 'I'hcn t,hc cxpcctcd payo(f for playcr j is cqual
Lu 1',l.r) -- ~~,Em~'(~)('~(~)- 'I'hc c.xpccted rnarginal payo(f for playcr i E I„ al.
.r r.ti' whcu hc playa his pure stratcgy (i, k) is givc~n by
Uk(x) - ~ U~(~) 11 xr.ir.
dE4,tiJ,)-ti,k) I-1,l~i
It is readily seen that U;(x) -~i-r x;,tU;(x) for every i E!„ and x E S.
A mixed strategy x E S is a Nash equilibrium if
U~(x) ~ U~(x) for all j E I„ and all k E { 1, ..., n~ }.
l~or c 7 0, wc define an e-proper equilibrium to be any completely mixed strategy
x(c) E S such that if U~(x(e)) C U~(x(e)), then x~,k(e) C ex~,r(e) for all j E I„ and
k, ! E{ 1, ... , n~ }. This implies that every player gives a better response always a
probability at least c-r times higher than a worse response. A mixed strategy y" E S
is called a proper equilibrium if there exist sequences {e(k)}kr and {y(e(k))}k ,
such that each e(k) ~ 0 and limk-.~ E(k) - 0, each y(e(k)) is an e(k)-proper
eqnilibrium, and límk-.~y(E(k)) - y". lt is shown in [í6~ that any strategic game
has a nonempty set of proper equilibria, being a subset of the set of perfect Nash
equilibria.
Now for x E S we define f(x) by
j~h(x) - U~(x) forjEl„andhE{1,...,n~}
h( (r) -((j;.(~(x),...,j,,,,,(~)) T for j E 1„ (2.l)
j1x) - ljllx)~i...ijn(t)~)~.
Clearly, j is a continuous function [rom the Cartesian product S to RM and using
the Brouwer fixed point theorem f has a stationary point i on S, satisfying (i~ -
x~)T j~(ï) ~ 0 for all j E I„ and x in S. This coincides with i being a Nash
equilibrium by recalling that U~(x) -~h x~,hU~(x) for every j E I„ and x E S.
F'urthermore we establish the following relationship between the two concepts above.6
Theorem 2.5 Lcl a noncooperative finitr n-person game I' in strate9ic form 6e
g~ivr.n as above. 77cen r' E S is a proper Nash equilibrium of the game áf and only
if x' is ra robust station.ary point of f on S defined by (2.1).
Ilcn~i~ l~hi~ probleni of finding propcr Nash equilibria is a special case oC the
problcn~ of (inding robusL stationary points on S. So, with the algorithrn to bc
discussed below, a proper Nash equilibrium can be computed.
3 The P-triangulation of the product space of
unit simplices
We first introduce some notations to be used later. The sets JV, No and I C J
represent the set of positive integers, the set of nonnegative integers and a proper
subset I of J, respectively. Moreover, for j E In the k-th component of x~ in
Sn~ will bc denoted by x~,k, also being the (~,-~ n; t k)-th component of a point
s in S. l~or j E In, e(j,k) denotes the (~;-~ n; -~ k)-th unit vector in R`y and
c(j) -~h-r e(j, h). Let v-(vi ;...; vn )T be any point in the relative interior of
.S. 'I'he point v will be the starting point of the algorithm. We define a vector
P-(Pi~.~.~ Pn )T E S by for every j E Ik
P~,k - vi,ik, k- 1, ..., n~
where (ir,...,in~) is a permutation of (1,...,n~) satisfying v~,;, 1 v~,;m for all 1
rn C n~. For l E[0,1] and j E In, let
n,
Pi,k(t) - Pi,ktk-rr'~Pi,~t`-r, for k- 1,...,n~.
;-r
lt is readily seen that p~,r(t) 1... ~ p~,n~(t) for t E [0,1].
Definition 3.1





~ xi r C~ p~,~(t) for any J C { 1, ..., n~ }
IEJ 1-1
with k - ~J~, and for j E In }.
Glc7
II. is casily sccn I,hat A(0) - 5', and that if v is thc baryccnter of S, thcn
A(1) -{ v}. More generally for every t E[0, 1] we have that v E A(t) and v is a
vertex of A( I). Moreover A(t) is a polytope for every t E [0,1].
I~or j E 1,,, J C { I,...,n~ }, and t E[0, 1], we define. a(j,J) and 6~,J(t) by
a(j, J) - ~ c(j, k),
kEJ
!
bi.J(t) - ~Pi,k(t) with l - ~J[.
k-1
Lcl, the collcction of ordercd indexed sets, Z, be defined by
Z - { I - (II~I,....Il.m~i I2.Ir...,IyPn7;....In,1i.-.,In.m~) I
h,~ C... C h,,,,~ C{ I,...,n~ },j E 1,,, wíth at leasL one Ik,c ~~}.
We say that I E Z conforms to J E Z, if it holds that every component of I is
also a component of J. [.et { Bk }kE,~r bc a strictly decreasing sequence of positive
numbers smaller than one and converging to zero. For I E Z and k E JV, let
f(k, I) -{ x E A(Bk) ~ aT(.i, Ii,h)Z - bi.li~n(ek)
for every h E{ 1, ..., m~ } and j E I„ }.
'Chen I'(k, I) is a face of A(9k) with dimension equal to M - n-~k-1 mk. For
1EZ,IcL
!'(0, l; I) -{ x[x - av t (1 - a)z for some z E F(1, I) and a E[0,1] }
and for k E JV
1'(k, k~ 1; I)-{ x~ x- ay -~ (1 - a)z for some y E F(k, l),
z E F(k -F 1,1), and a E[0, 1] }.
'['hc subdivision of S for nl - n2 -`l, Bk - 2-k for k E N,
and v-( I ~2, 1~2; 3~5, 2~5)T, is depicted in Figure 1.
higurc l. Subdivision of S for ral - nz - 2.
I'or I E Z, we denote the union of F(k, k-~ 1; I) over all k - 0,1,... by F(I).
Notice Lhat the dimension of F(I) is equal to t- M-n -~~-r nzr ~-1. A simplicial
subdivision underlying the algorithm must be such that every set F(k, k~ 1; I) is
subdivided into t-dimensional simplices. Such a triangulation can be described as
follows. For I E Z, we denote v(0, I) - v and for k E J1~, v(k, I) is a relative interior
point (e.g., the barycenter) of F(k,l). For 1 E Z, if I consists of M-n components,ti
t.hc~n l.'(k, I) is a vertex of A(9k). For general 1 E Z, let F(k, I(M - n)) be a vertex
of l~'(k, I), i.i~.. I(M - n) has M - ri. cornponcnts and 1 conforms to 1(M - n).
~~luri,uvi~r li,l (.I~,.~~1....,J,) - ry(t,l(h'1 - ta)) bc a confonnation bctwcv,n I aud
I( Al ~t), i.~,., Ji :- I( M11 - tr), .1,~ E Z for k-'?,...,1 - l, J~ - l, .IA ~~onfornis Lo .Ik--i
:,n~l ha.ti uiu~ ruiu~,uni~nl. Irss Lhan .lr -i for k- 2,...,1. 14tr givan k C JVu, t E Z, a.ncl
~(1, I(!11 n)), I,h,~ sulr.~~l. l~'(k,k } I; t,ry(t, I(M11 -tt))) of 1~'(k,k ~ I; I) is th~(inr~d
tu hr I h~~ ~~unvi,x hnll uf t~(k, Ji ) , 'r'(d~, Ji), ..., z~(k, Jt), v(k ~ 1, J~ ), v(k ~- I, J-i), .,






where qo - v(k -~ 1, I(M - n)) - v(k, I(M - n)), and for j - 1,..., t- 1, 0 e~ C 1,
v'(~ti) -~(v(k t ~, ~~fr) - v(k f 1,~~)) -~ (i - a)(v(k, ~~tt) - v(k, ~~)).
'1'hc dimension of F(k, k~ 1;1, ry(I, I(M - n))) is equal to t and F(k, k-}- 1; I) is
the union of F(k, k~ 1; y(1, I(A1 - n))) over all conformations y(I,1(M - n)) and
over all index sets 1(~N - n) conformed by 1.
Let, d be an arbitrary positive integer.
Definition 3.2 For k E JUo, the set Gd(k, k f 1;1, y(I, I(M - n))) is the collec-
tiorz oj t-simplices a(a, n) with vertices yt,..., yttl in F(k, k-~ 1;1, ry(I,1(M - n)))
such that
(l) ,y~ - v(k, I(M - n)) -~ a(0)d-`qo t~~-i a(7)y'(a(~)~d)~(a(0) t dk) where a-
(a(0),a(1),...,a(M-n-1))T is a vector of integers such that 0 C a(0) G d-1,
and a(M - n- 1) -... - a(t) - 0 G a(t - 1) L... C a(2) c a(1) G a(0) f dk;
~2) a-(ar,..., at) is a permutation of (0,1,..., t- 1) such that s G s' if for some
y E{ 1,...,t - 2} il holds that a, - q, ~r,~ - q f- 1, a(q) - a(q ~ 1) tin case
q 1 1, and a(0) -~ kd - a(1) in r.a.se y- 0;
(3~ I,e,t i be such thal n; - 0. Then
y't' - y' fy"~(a(o)Id)I(a(o) -~ kd),~ - i,...,i - i,
ytti - v(k,l(M - n)) f(a(~) t 1)d-t4
e-t
t~ a(j)v'((a(o) ~ i)Id)I(a(o) f i -~ kd)
;-,9
t~. ~~"'((a(o) t i )~~t)I(~r(~) t t f k,!),
~-1
r~~ti - r~i t qn'((a(fi) f I)~c!)~(a(0) t l f kd),z G j G L.
7'hc sct Cd(k,k f L I,ry(I,I(M - n))) is a simplicial subdivision of F(k,k f
1;l.-y(1,1(M - n))) with grid size d-r. Moreover, the union Gd(k,k f l;l) of
Cd(k,k ~ l;ry(!, I(M - n))) over all conformations ry(T,1(M - n)) and I(M - n)
confonncd by ! is a simplicial subdivision of !~(k, k t 1; !). The union Gd(k, k~ I)
of Gd(k, k f 1; !) over all sets I E Z induces a triangulation of A(Bktr)`A(Bk).
'1'aking the rmion Cd(k) oí Gd(j, j f I) over j - 0,1, ..., k- 1, we obtain a simplicial
subdivision of A(Bk) with grid size d-r. The union of Gd(k) over all k E~Ío is a
simplicial subdivision of the relative interior of S and is called the P-triangulation
of S. We remark that for I E Z the union Gd(I) of Gd(k, k f 1; I) over k- 0, 1, ..., is
a simplicial subdivision of the set F(!). The P-triangulation of S for nr - n2 - 2,
d- 2, Ok - 2-k for k E ~1~, and v- (1~2,1~2; 3~5,2~5)T is illustrated in Figure 2.
Fígure 2. The P-triangulation of S for nr - n2 - 2.
As norm we use the Euclidean norm II . I~ m RM. For a set B in RM, we define
thc diarnc~ter of B by
diam(!3) - suP{ IIy' - yZII I y~, J2 E B}.
"I'hcn for givc~n k C- ~1~o thc mcsh sizc of Gd(k,k f 1) is equal t,o
!Ik d - Sllp{ d2arrt(U) I O" E Gd(k, k~ 1) }.
Now we have the following observation.
Lemma 3.3 For the P-triangulation of S wilh grid size d-1, it holds that
kl.mbk,d - ~.
1'he 1'-triangulation therefore is such that the diameter of the simplices converges
to zaro when the boundary of S is approached.
4 The path of the algorithm
In this section we discuss how to operate the algorithm in the P-triangulation of S
to approximate a robust stationary point of a continuous function f on S. Starting
at the point v, the algorithm will generate a sequence of adjacent simplices of the
P-triangulal,ion in the set F(I ) having I-complete common facets, for varying I E Z.10
Definition 4.1 I,r.t be given lhe funclion f: S~--~ RM. For given I-
(lr.l,...,ll.,,,,;h.l,.. ,IZ,,,,,;...;l,,,t,.. ,1,,,,,,,) E Z and s- t- l or t, where
f- fl1 - n-~j-1 nz~ {- 1, an s-simplex o with verlices yt,... ,y'tt is 1-complele if
flrr ~i~~lrrn of liarnr rqvalinn..
.~~
~j(y') 1-~`C~`Ftn~a(j,li,h) 1-~Pr1 e(1)~-1 ~~ (9.1)
L. J L. L i, J ` ` ~-t 1 ~-th-r 0 r-r 0 1
wltere 0 is an M-vector of zeros, has a solution ~~, i- 1,...,s ~ 1, It~h, j E 1„ and
It - I,...,rni, and ~~, l E I,,, satisfying a~ 1 0, i- 1,...,s -}- 1, p~ h 1 0, 7 E In,
h - I,...,rrti.
Notice that the system (4.1) has (s f 1) ~- (~~-r mi -~ n) columns, so when
s- t- 1- M - n-~~-r mi, the system has M f 1 columns and for s- t one
column more. A solution a;, i- 1,...,s t 1, It~,h, j E I,,, h- 1,..., mi, Q~, l E I,,,
will be denoted by (a`,p',f3').
Nondegeneracy assumption~ For s- t- 1 the system (4.1) has a unique
solution (a',p',l3`) with a~ ~ 0, i- 1,...,t, and iti.h 1 0, j E I,,, h- 1,. .,rni,
and for s- t at most one variable of (a',p') is equal to zero.
I lndor I his nondc~gcncracy aSS1llrlptlOil rrn -{ v} is lo-completc with lo -
(li.l,..., li.,,,-t;lz,t,...,l2,nz-t;....lo,t,...,lo.n.,-t) where Ioh - {71,...,7h } for j E
I,,, Iz - I,... , ni - 1 satisfying [or j E l,,, f~,i, (v) 7 fi,iz(v) 7..- ~ ji,i.., (v). Notice
t.hat for j E In, (jr,..., j,,,) is a permutation of (1,...,ni).
'1'fle algorithm now starts with av for 1- Io and fo]lows a sequence of adjacent
t-simplices in F(!) for varying I, ! E Z, such that their common facets are !-
complctc. ln this way within a finite nurnber of steps cither thc algorithm reaches
a poinl, a in an (M - n)-dirnensional simplex for which fi,k(á) - fi,t(i) for every
j E 1„ and k,1 E{ 1, ..., ni }, where f is the piecewise linear approximation of f
with respect to the P-triangulation, or for k- 1, 2,... the algorithm finds an I(k)-
ccimplet,e simplex in F(k,!(k)) [or some I(k) C Z. Suppose the latter case holds,
then wc have t.he following result. Let { Bt }1-1 be given as in Section 3.
Lemma 4.2 hor snme k E N and I E Z, let a with vertices yt,...,,y' be an
1-cnntplelr (t - I)-simplex lyiny in h(k,l). Let (a',IC',~3') be lhe corresponding
itrtiquc solution of syslem (4.1). Then x-~i-1 a;y' is a Ok-robust stationary point
nj the piecewise linear appraxirnalion f of j with respcct to lhe P-triangulation.
Morcover, x i.s a stationary point of f on A(Bk).
t'1'his assumption can be dropped if we use lexicographic pivoting method in linear program-
rning to solve. system (4.1), see e.g. Todd [21].~'ruu~~: ti~`i` :`ppi`n~IÍX. C7
I~ur I- ~l~,i,...,li,,,,,~lt,~,...,lz.,,,,;...;h,.~,...,ln.,,,n) E Z, wc daline 1~'"(!) -
{ y E R'~c ~ y-~j'-i ~rR-i Ni,ha(7, li,n)f~i-i ~j~c'(1), hi.ti ~ 0 and ~ii E R}. ClearlY,
for a statiouary point x E F(k,l) of J on A(~k) it holds that f(x) E F'(1), and
conversely. The next lemma shows that a Bk-robust stationary point of f is an
approxirnatc Ok-robust stationary point of f.
Lemma 4.3 Get rtk,d - sup{ diarn( f(Q)) ~ v E Gd(k - 1, k) }. Let x be a Bk-
robust stationary point of the piecewise linear appmximatáon f of f with respect to
the Y-triangulation with grid size d-' obtained by the algorithm, so that x E F(k, I)
jor some ! E Z. 7'hen f( x) lies in the rlk,d-neighborhood of F'(I), i.e. there ás a
,y E F'(l) such that ~~y - f(x)~~ G qk,d.
I'r'oof: ScY~ Appendix. ~
Since S' is compact and f is continuous on S, the error r,k,d tends to zero as the
mesh size 8,~ d goes to zero when k goes to infinity. Let xk be a Bk-robust stationary
point. of j and pk,d the error in Lemma 4.3. Suppose that the algorithm generates
the sequence { xti ~ h- 1, 2, ... } of approximate Bk-robust stationary points of f
which therefore has a cluster point x'. For simplicity of notation we can assume
that this sequence itself converges to x'. We are now ready to state the following
corol lary.
Corollary 4.4
Suppose lhat xk is an approxímate Ok-robust stationary point genernted by the
algorilhm, Jork- 1, 2,... . Then the seqvence { xk ~ k- 1, 2, ... } has a cluster point
and rtny cluster poínt is a robust statàonary point of f on S.
Proof: See Appendix. ~
In case the algorithm terminates with an (M - n)-dimensional simplex a with
vert.ices y',...,,yM-"f', then i -~M~"t' a~y' is a robust stationary point of f. If the
arcnra~y of approximat.ion is not satisfactory, t,he. algorithm can be rest,arted at the
point. .r wil.h a srnallcr grid sizc d-' to find a bcttcr approximatc robust stationary
poinl., hopefully within a small number of steps. Without loss of generality we may
ass~nne` thal. the algorithm in this case generates a sequence {~ h ~ h- f, 2, ... },
wh~`n` .r~` is t.hc robusL stat.ionary point of f corresponding to t,hc grid sizc, dh' for
an increasing seyuence of positive integers { dh ~ h- 1,2,... }. It is readily seen that
Cor nvcry k E No, thc mesh size 6k,d,, tends to zero when h goes to infinity. `Iherefore
the sequence { áh ~ h- 1,2,... } has a subsequence converging to a point being a
robust. stationary point of J on .S.tiuw Ic~l us concludc~ this scction with somc intcrprctation on thc path gcner-
alc,cl b~' Ihc~ algoritlnn in garnc-t.hcurct.ic' Lcnns. St.arting with a cornplctcly rnixc,cl
titrrLc~,r;~' r IJrr algoril.linr initially gcnc~ratc~s a piccewisc lincar pal.h of sl.ratcgic:s in
1(Oi), un whir'h t.hr~ probabilil.ics of all actions of cac'Ir playcr arc~ simutancously
adjustc~d tiuch t.hat. for cvcry playcr thc highcr thc marginal payof[ of an act,ion
is, t he highcr the corrc~poncíing probability will be. As soon as the path hits the
boundary of .4(~r), a Or-proper equilibrium of the piecewise linear approximation
f of the expected marginal payoff function f of the game is obtained. From then
on the algorithm continues to follow a piecewise linear path of B-proper equilibria
of J in such a way that for each player an action with a higher piecewise linear
rnarginal payoff is always given a probability at least 6-r times higher than an ac-
tion with a lower piccewise linear marginal payoff. ln this way either the algorithm
terrninates in the interior oi S or an approximation is found having the required
a priorly chosen accuracy. In the first case the algorithm may be restarted at the
found approximation with a smaller grid size in order to improve the accuracy.
In the next section we shall describe the steps of the algorithm in more detail.
5 The steps of the algorithm
Now we turn to give a detailed description of the steps of the algorithm. The al-
gorithm starts with the zero-dimensional simplex ao - { v}. Under nondegeneracy
assurnption, t.hen the zero-dimensional simplex { v} is Io-complete where lo E Z is
as clc~scribcd in the previous section. Moreover, vo is a facet of a unique 1-simplex
o' in h'( Ir'), wherc or - o(a, rr) with a- 0 E R`y-" and a-(0). Since under thc
nonclcgeneracy assumption for any given I E Z an I-complete t-simplex has at most
two I-complcte, facets and a facet of a t-simplex in F(I) either is a facet of exactly
onc other t-simplex in F(1) or lies in the boundary of F(1), we obtain that the
I-cornplete t-simplices a(a, ~r) in F(1) determine sequences of adjacent t-simplices
in l.'(I) with 1-complete common facets. As described below, the sequences of the
I-complete t-simplices in F(1) can be uniquely linked together for varying I E Z
to obtain sequences of adjacent simplices of varying dimension. One of these se-
quences starts with oo in F(lo) and is followed by the algorithm, so starting at
the point v, the algorithm generates a unique sequence of I-complete adjacent t-
simplices in F(!) of varying dimension. With respect to each of these simplices a
linear programming (Ip) pivot step is made in (4.1). When, with respect to some
rr(a,rr) with vcrtices ~r,...,,yrtr in Gd(k, k~ 1; l, ry(I, I(n-1))) for somc k E JVo and
ry(1, I(n -1)), the variable ~q, for some q, 1 C q G t f 1, becomes zero through an Ip
pivol. step in (4.1 ), t,hcn Lhe facet r opposit.c the vertex ,y9 of o(a, rr) is I-complctc.
If r docs not lie in Lhe boundary of the set, l:(k, k f l; l, ry(I, l(n - 1))), then a
t-sirnplex a(á,ir) sharing the common facet r with o can be obtained írom a and rr
as given in Table 1, where E(j-1) is the j-th unit vector in RM-", j- 1,..., M-n.1 '3
fablc I. f'ararneters Of rr iï thc vert.ex y4 of o(a,a) is replaced.
~ a
q - l (nz,...,an~r~) a ~ F(~i)
1~ E~ G i. ~ 1 (7rr,....7ry-2,7rq,7rq-r,~rq}I...,Jrt) a
q- t f 1 (nc,xl,...,~rE-r) a- E-(~t)
'I he algorithm continues with ó by rnaking an lp pivot step in (4.1) with
(J(y)T, 1)T, where y is the vertex of ir opposite the facet r. In case the 1-complete
facet. r of a simplex o(a, a) in Gd(k, k f 1; l, ry(!, I(M - n))) is not a facet of an-
other sirnplex in Gd(k,k f l;l,ry(l,l(M - n))), then r lies iu the boundary of
F(k k-~ I: l, y(],1(M - n))). According to Definition 3.2 we have the following
Ic~mrna.
Lemma 5.1 Let a(a, a) Ge a t-simple.x in F(k, k f 1; I, ry(I, I(.M - n.))). The
JacEt r nJ a oppasitc the verlez y4, 1 G q C t~ 1, lies in the óoundary of this set íJ
n.nd onl~~ r;( onr oJ lhe Jollotning casr.s occurs:
(r) 9- 1, n~ - ~, and a(0) - d- 1;
(ii} I G q G t-~ 1, ~rq - h t],~y-r - ji for sorne h E { 0, 1, ..., l- 2}, and
a(h) - a(h } 1) ia r,ase la ~ 1, and a(0) f kd - a(1) in case h- 0;
(iii) q - t~- l, nc - U, and a(0) - ~;
~2r,) q - t~ 1, ~rc - l- 1, and a(t - 1) - 0.
Supposc the algorithrn gcnerates a sirnplex Q(a, ir) as given in Lemma 5.l and 1y
bccotncs zcro after rnaking an Ip pivot step in (4.1). Then the facet r of a opposite
tu f he~ vc~rtcx y~ is I-complete. In case (i) the facet r lies in the face h(k -F 1, I)
of ,1(0~,}r) and tbe algoritLm rcachcs a p~tr-robust stationary point i -~;t2 ~;y'
of ~- lying in ~.'(A: ~- I, I). (f k is large enough, then z is an approximate robust
st.ationary point of J. Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds with á by making an lp
pivoL step in ( 1.1) with (JT (y), 1)T, where y is the. vertex of rr opposite. the facet r
and a in F(k f 1, k~- 2; l,y(1, I(M - n))) is obtained according to Table 1.
In case (iii) the facet. r lies in the face F(k, I) of A(Bk) and the algorithm
cont.inucs with á by making an ]p pivot step in (4.1) with (fT (y), 1)T, where y
is thc vcrtcx of ó opposite thc facet r and á in F(k - 1, k; I,ry((, I(M - n))) is
ohtaincd ~.Iso frorn '1'ablc 1.lh
In casi~ (ii.) and if h ) l, the facet r is a facet of the t-simplex á- o(a,rr) iu
I-'(k, k ~ I; I) lying in thc subseL !.'(k,k ~ l; 1,7(l, !(M - re))) wit,h
7(l, I(M -TC)) - (Jl,...,Jn,Jntl,Jntz,...,J~),
wherc Jn~~ E Z, Jntl ~ Jnt~, is uniquely determined by the properties that Jntl
conforms to Jn, has one component less than Jn, and is conformed by Jntz. In
case (ii) and if h- 0, then T is a facet of the t-simplex rT - Q(a, a) in F(k, k f
I; l,ry(l, Í(M - n))) with Í(M - n) and ry defined as follows. Let
Jl - 1(M-n) - (Il,l,...h,n~-l;Iz,1,...,Iz,nx-1;...;In,1,...,In,nn-1l-
In case
for some j E In, we have
1(M - n) - (h~l, ..y h~n,-l;
. .. ~ li,l, ..., ij,n~-2, IJ.ni-1,
...; In,l, ..., In,nn-1)
Wlth li.n~-1 -( L(~,1),...,(.i,nJ)}`IJ,ni-1)UIJ,ni-2'
In casc
for sornc j E In, then
Í( M - n) - (11,1, ..., h.ni-1; ...; h,t, Ii,z, ..., ]i,ni-l; ...; In,l, ..., In,nn-1)
with Íi,i - lia`li,l.
Finally, if
J2 -( h,l, ..., h,n,-l, ...~ li,l, ..., h,kv IJ,kf2, ..., li,n~-1, ...~ In,l, ..., In,n..-1)
for sonle j E In and k E{ 1, ..., ni - 3}, we have
I(M - rl) -(ll,i,..., Il,n,-; ...; li,1i ..., li,k, li,ktl, li.ktz,..., ]i,n,-1; ...; In,l, ..., In,nn-1)
with li,ktt - Ii~kU(li,ktz`li,kfl). Then7(1,1(M-n))-(1(M-n),Jz,...,Jl). In
all subcases of case (ii) the algorithm continues with making a pivot step in (4.1)
wit}i (jT (,y), 1)T, where y is the vertex oí the new t-simplex á opposite the facet r.
ln case (iv) the facet lies in the subset F(k, k~ 1; J~-1) of F(1). More precisely,
r is Lhe (t - 1)-simplex a(a, á) in F(k, k{- 1; I, ry(1,1(M - n))), where I- Jt-l,
ry(I, 1(M - n)) -(Jl,...,Jt-1), and á-(al,...,a~-1). The algorithm now proceeds15
with making a pivot step in (4.1) with (-aT(j,~~,h),0)T, where h,h is the unique
c ompon~~nt oC JI-1 but not of J,.
I~inally, if through a lincar programming pivot step in (4.1), Lhe variable {r~,h be-
corne~ 0 for somc j E{ l, ..., n } and for some h E{ 1, ..., m~ }, the algorithrn termi-
natcs wit.h t.hc approximate robust stationary point i -~; a;y' of f ií ~~ 1 ml - 1
and rest.arts ihen at thc point i with a smaller grid size in case the accuracy is not
nat.isfactory. Otherwise, the simplex o(n, n) is I-complete and is a Cacet of a unique
(l f I)-sirnplc:x Q in !~(I) with
! -- ( Ii,i , ..., I i,,n, ; 12.i. ..., 12,,,,,; ...; h,l, ..., ~i,h-1 ~ li,h~l, ..., h,,,,, ; ...; h,,1, ..., h,,m..).
More praciscly, Q- Q(a, ~) lies in F'(k, k~ 1; l,7(1, I(M - n))), where ry(I,1(M -
rl)) -(y,Í), and á-(nl,.-.,~nt). The algorithm continues by making a pivot
step in (~l.l ) with (f~( j), 1)T , where y is the vertex of ó opposite the facet Q. This
completes the description of how the algorithm operates in the P-triangulation oí
S.
6 Examples
In this scction we give some examples to show that the concept of a robust stationary
point is indeed a refinement of the concept of a stationary point and moreover to
demonstrate the performance of the algorithrn.
l:xarnple 1: Let a continuous function f: S3 x S2 ~---r R3 x R2 be defined by








for :r E.q- ~l'he set of st.ationary points of this function is equal t.o:
{(~l,l, ~1.2, 0; 1, 0)T, x E S} U{ (xl.l, Z,.2, 0; 0, 1)T, x E S}.
However, only (1,0,0; 1,0)T is a robust stationary point.
Fxarnple 2: We consider the 2-person game given by Myerson [l6]. F.ach player has
three pure strategies and the payoff is given in Table 2.




rGr (1, 1) (6, ~) (-9, -9)
~2 (0, 0) (0, 6) (-7, -7)
~3 (-9, -9) (-7~ -7) (-7~ -7)
As shown in [16], this game has three Nash equilibria: (zlit, ~1), (~izi ~z) and (t,i3i ~).
Among these equilibria, (z,it, ~t ) and (r(iz, ~z) are perfect equilibria. However, (~ir, ~1)
is thc only proper equilibrium. Now we transform the game into the framework of
system (2.l ). 'I'he corresponding function is defined by f: S3 x S3 ~--~ R3 x R.3
with










-gxz,r - 7xz,z - 7~23
xr,t - 9x1,3
-7x1,3
-9xr.1 - Íxl,z - 7x,,g.
(6.2)
'I'he function f has three stationary points: (1, 0, 0;1, 0, 0)T, (0, 1, 0; 0, ], 0)T and
(0,0,1;0,0,1)T, corresponding to the three Nash equilibria given above, respec-
tively. Among these stationary points the only robust stationary point is
(1, 0, 0; l, 0, 0)T which corresponds to the proper equilibrium (~il, ~r ).
Let us now compare the procedure of van den Elzen and Talman [6] with the
algorithm using F,xample 2. Let v-(1~3, 1~3, 1~3; 1~3, 1~3, 1~3)T, the barycenter
of S. We choose v as khe starting point of the procedure. The projection of the
pal.h ge~nc~rated by the procedure on .S3 is shown in h'igure 3. The procedure in [6]
converges to t.he perfect equilibriurn (zliz, ~z). While the algorithm always converges
Lo the propc~r equilibrium (~~~,~t) no matter what interior point of S is chosen as
thc starting point. Figure 4 illustrates the projection oí the path generated by the
algorithrn on S3, when v is the starting point. We remark that we implemented the
algorit.hrn by using lexicographic pivoting rules and taking Bk - 2-~ for k E JV.
Figure 3. The projection of the path of the procedure in [6] on S3.
Figure 4. The projection of the path of the algorithm on S3.
Appendixf;
Proof of Lemma 4.2 Since 1-(II,~,...,h,,,,,;Iz,r,...,lz,m,;...;ln,r,...,ln,nm) E Z,
th~n for c~c~r~' j E In thcrc exist li G lz G. .. c 1,,,~ such that
Ij,,
l,,z
- { ii,...,il, }
- { :~,...,z!„zl~tl,.--~riz }
Ij,,n - { ir, ..., ilm~ }
{ 1,. .,Iti }`IJ.mJ - { 2lmJtlr...,2n7 }'
'1'hc~n it. follows from equation (4.1) that at x-~;-r a~y'
fi,;~ Íx) - ... - fi,~l, (~) - Ici,r f ... -F l~i,m, } ~i
~ f7~4,i~ (:L) - ... - fJ,,~2(~) - Í~j~2 f ... ~ hl,mJ ~ Yr ~
~ fl.~i.nJ-~tl (~) - ... - fJ.iln,, (y) - ~j,mj } ~j
7 .~iá~~,~~ ri (.r) - ... - .~~.~..1 (~r) - ~~j,
w6~,n~ ~c~, ~ 0 fur 'à - I,...,nt;. Nuw it is nol. clitlicult to chcck 1,hat
~i,; G p~xi,h whenever fi,;(~) C fi,h(x)'
IL mcans f hat x is a Ok-robust st,ationary point of the piecewise linear approxi-
Inat.ion f oC f with respect to the P-triangulation.
Morcovcr, for each face F(k, l), I E Z, let F'(I) be the set of all M-dimensional
vectors ,y such that every point of F(k,I) is a solution of the linear programming
problern
max yTx subject to i E A(Bk).
'I'hen the stationary poínt problem for f on A(Bk) is the problem of finding
a point, :c in A(Ok) such t,hat f(x) E F'(I) for a minimum face F(k,l) of A(Bk)
containing :r.. Duality theory (see e.g [19]) implies that
~,~.(
~) -{!I ~ J- L L Ic,.hu(J, ~i~h) i~, ~~lc'(f ). lcj.h ~ 0 and ~i! E IC }.
j-1h-1 !-1 -
lt follows from above that f(x) E F"(I). Hence x is a stationary point of f on
n(0~,) OYroof of Lemma 4.3 I,et y', ..., y` be the vertices of a(t-1)-simplex of Cd(k- I, k)
in l~'(k, I) ronLaining .r. 'I'hen f(.r) -~~-i ~~f(y~) lics in ("(I), wherc~ a~,..., ~~
am ~ onvc,x c ombination coefficient.s snch that, :r -~~-r a~y~. 'Pherefore









Proof of Corollary 4.4 '1'he continuity of f, the property of the P-triangulation
and the conrpactness of S imply that for any given e~ 0, there exists a positive
integer l,, such that for k E JV with k~ L, there is a Bk-robust stationary point
a.k E A(Ok) of f which is in the c-neighborhood of ak. On the other hand, since
lirnk-,~ xk - x', it immediately follows that
lim ik - x'.
k-.oo
Ifcnrc~ s' is a robust stationary point of f on S. O
References
[1J E.1.. Allgower and K. Georg, Numerical Continuation Methods, Springer-
Vcrlag, 13erlin, 1990.
[`l] E. van Uamme, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Springer-Verlag,
Bcrlin, 1987.
[3] 'I'.M. Uoup, Simplicial Algorithms on the Simplotope, Lecture Notes in Eco-
nornics and Mathematical Systems 318, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1988.
[4] 'I'.M. I)oup and A.J.J. "I'alman, "A new variable dimension simplicial algo-
rithm to find equilibria on the product space of unit simplicesr, Mathematical
Progrnmrning 37 (1987) 319-355.
[~i] B.C. Eavcs, rHomotopies for computation of fixed points", Mathematical Pro-
gramrning 3 (197`l) 1-22.19
[fi] :1.1I. van den Flren and A..I.J. "Ialman, " A procedure for finding Nash equi-
libria in bi-matrix garnesr, ZOR-Methods and Models oj Operations Research
a~r (1991) 27-43.
(i] ('.13. (~arci:r, ('.I;. Lc~mkc a.nd ll.,l. Liil.hi, "Sirnplicial approxirnation of an cyui
lihriuru poinl. of noncoopcrat.ivc N-pcrson gamcs, in: Mathcmatical Program-
nring,'I'.('. Ilu and S.M. Robinson, cds., Academic Press, Ncw York (1973) pp.
'L27-260.
[8] A1. Jansen, "On I,he sct of proper equilibria of a bimatrix garne", lnternational
Jou~r-nal of Came Theory 22 (1993) 97-106.
[9] IL~V. Kuhn, "Simplicial approximation of fixed points", Proceedàngs National
Acadcm~ of Sciences U. S. A. 61 ( 1968) 1238-1242.
[10] I?. Kohberg and J.h'. Mcrtens, " On the strategic stability of equilibria", Econo-
nrctrica 54 (1986) ]003-1037.
[11] C. van der Laan, "'I'he computation of general equilibrium in economies with
a block diagonal pattern", L?conometrica 53 (1985) 659-665.
[1`l] G. van der Laan and A.J.J. Talman, "A restart algorithm for computing fixed
points without an extra dimension", Mathematical Programmàng 20 (1979) 33-
48.
[l'3] C. van der Laan and A.J.J. Talman, " On the computation of fixed points in
t.he product space of unit simplices and an application to noncooperative N
person games", Mathematics oj Operntions Research 7 (1982) 1-13.
[14] C.I~;. Lemke and J.I'. Howson, " Gquilibrium points of bimatrix games", SIAM
Re7~ieu~ I'2 (1964) 413-423.
[l5] A. Mansur and J. W-halley, "A decomposition algorithm for general equilibrium
conrputation with application to international trade models". Econometrica 50
(1982) 1547-1557.
[16] 1{.13. Myerson, "Refinements of Nash equilibrium concepts", International
Jnurnal oj C,ame Thcory 8 (1978) 73-80.
[l7] .l. lioscnrniiller, " On a gencralization of the Lemkc-Ilowson algorithm to non-
coopcralivc n-pcrson games", SIAM Journal oj Applicd Maliacmatics 21 (1971)
73-79.
[18] IL Scarf. n'Che approximation of fixed points of a continuous mappingH, SIAM
Jouraal oj Applied Mathematics 15 (1967) 157-172.'LO
[I!)] A. Schrijver, 7'hcory of Linear and Integer Programming, John Wiley 8r Sons,
Nr~w York, 1986.
[?0] I{. Sc,ltr,n, " 1{cr,sanrinalion of thc pcr(cctnc~s conrepL for equilibrirnn point5
in r~~fr~nsicc~ ga,nn~s", Inlrrnalional Journrrl of (;amc 7'b.rorr~ 1 (197Fi) 'Lb-~)~).
~'!I ~ 11..1. I'u~lrl, 'I'hc~ ('unrpnl.al.iun uf I~ixc,rl I'uinl.s ancl Applical.iuns, Lc~c turc, Nutc~s
ín I:cuncnnics anrl AlaLhc~rnafical Systt,n)s 124, Spriugcr-Vcrlag, 13crlin, 1976.
[Z'L] It. Wilson, n Computing equilibria of N-person gamesr, SlAM Journal of Ap-
plicd A4athematics 2) (1971) 80-87.
['l3] 1{. Wilson, " Cornputing simply stable equilibria", Gconometrica 60 (1992)
1039-1070.
[`24] Y. Yamamoto, "A pat.h-following procedure to find a proper equilibrium of
(initc games", Intcrnational Journal of Game Theory 22 (1993) 49-59.
(25] "!.. Yang, "A simplicial algorithm for computing robust stationary points of a
conlinuous function on thc unit simplex", f)iscussion Papcr No. 93Fi5, Ccntl?R,
I'ilbur~; I ~nivc~rsily (1993).Discussion Papcr Scrics, CcntF.R, Tilburg Univcrsity, The Ncthcrlands:
(For pre~ious papers please consult previous discussion papers.)
No. Author(s)









9315 F. C Dros1 and





9318 M.J.G. van Eijs
9319 S. Hurkcns
9320 J.J.G. Lcmmen and
S.C.W. Eijffinger











Fcmalc Lalwur Supply in Farm Households: Fann and
Off-Farm Participation
Fonnal and Informal Sector Employment in Urban Areas of
Bolivia
Marginalization and Contemporaneous Aggregation in
Multivariate GARCH Processes
Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability
Consumption over the Life Cycle and over the Business
Cycle
A Note on Robinson's Test of Independence
On Games Corresponding to Sequencing Situations
with Ready Times
On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments - A Personal Review
On the Determination of the Control Parameters of the Optimal
Can-order Policy
Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Buming Money
Tlie Quantity Approach to Financial Integration: The
Feldstein-Horioka Criterion Revisited
Environmental Quality and Pollution-saving Technological
Change in a Two-sector Endogenous Growrth Model
The Will to Save Money: an Essay on Economic Psychology
The (2"'m" - 2)-Ray Algorithm: A New Variable Dimension
Simplicial Algorithm For Computing Economic Equilibria on
S" x Rm
The Financing and Taxation of U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad
Central Bank Independence: Theory and Evidence
Infant Industry Protection with Leaming-by-Doing
9327 J.P.J.F. Scheepens Bankruptcy Litigation and Optimal Debt ContractsNo. Author(s)
9328 'f.C. To
9329 F. de Jong, "f. Nijman
and A. Riiell
9330 H. Huizinga
i133 I I 1. I luii.inga
9332 V. Fcltkamp, A. Koster,
A. van den Nouweland,
P. Borm and S. Tijs
9333 B. Lauterbach and
U. Ben-"Lion
9334 B. Melenberg and
A. van Soest
9335 A.L. Bovenberg and




9339 W. Guth and H. Kliemt
9340 T.C. To
9341 A. Demirgu~-Kunt and
H. Huizinga
9342 G.J. Almekinders
9343 E.R.van Dam and
W.H. Haemers
9344 H. Carlsson and
S. Dasgupta
9345 F. v:m dcr Pkicg and
A.L. Bovcnbcrg
9346 J.P.C. Blanc and
R.D. van der Mei
9347 J.P.C. Blanc
Titlc
Tariffs, Rent Extraction and Manipulation of Competition
A Comparison of the Cost of Trading French Shares on the
Paris Bourse and on SEAQ Intemational
The Welfare Effects of Individual Retirement Accounts
'I'ime Preferonce and International Tax Competition
Linear Production with Transport of Products, Resources and
Technology
Panic Behavior and the Performance of Circuit Breakers:
Empirical Evidence
Semi-parametric Estimation of the Sample Selection Model
Green Policies and Public Finance in a Small Open Economy
On the Economic Independence of the Central Bank and lhe
Persistence of Inflation
Characterizations of a Game Theoretical Cost Allocation
Method
Provision of Public Goods With Incomplete Information:
Decentralization vs. Central Planning
Competition or Co-operation
Export Subsidies and Oligopoly with Switching Costs
Barriers to Portfolio Investments in Emerging Stock Markets
Theories on the Scope for Foreign Exchange Market Intervention
Eigenvalues and the Diameter of Graphs
Noise-Proof Equilibria in Signaling Games
Environmcntal Policy, Public Goods and the Marginal Cost
of Public Funds
The Power-series Algorithm Applied to Polling Systems with
a Dormant Server
Performance Analysis and OptimiTation with the Power-
series AlgorithmNo. Author(s)
9348 R.M.W.J. Beetsma and
F. van dcr Ploeg
9349 A. Simonovits
9350 RC. Douven and
J.C. Engwerda
93~ I F. Vella and
M. Verbeek
9352 C. Meghir and
G. Weber
9353 V. Feltkamp
9354 R.J. de Groof and
M.A. van Tuijl
9355 Z. Yang
9356 E. van Damme and
S. Hurkens
9357 W. Guth and B. Peleg
9358 V. Bhaskar
9359 F. Vella and M. Verbeek
9360 W.B. van den Hout and
J.P.C. Blanc









Intramarginal Interventions, Bands and the Pattem of EMS
Exchange Rate Distributions
Intercohort Heterogeneity and Optimal Social Insurance Systems
Is There Room for Convergence in the E.C.?
Estimating and Interpreting Models with Endogenous
Treatment Effects: The Relationship Between Competing
Estimators of the Union Impact on Wages
Intertemporal Non-separability or Borrowing Restrictions? A
Disaggregate Analysis Using the US CEX Panel
Altemative Axiomatic Characterizations of the Shapley and
Banzhaf Values
Aspects of Goods Market Integration. A Two-Country-Two
-Sector Analysis
A Simplicial Algorithm for Computing Robust Stationary Points
of a Continuous Function on the Unit Simplex
Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing
On Ring Formation In Auctions
Neutral Stability In Asymmetric Evolutionary Games
Estimating and Testing Simultaneous Equation Panel Data
Models with Censored Endogenous Variables
The Power-Series Algorithm Extended to the BMAPIPH~I Queue
An (s,q) Inventory Model with Stochastic and Interrelated Lead
Times
A Closer Look at Economic Psychology
On the Connectedness of the Set of Constrained Equilibria
A Note on "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a
Repeated Game"
Direct Crowding Out, Optimal Taxation and Pollution Abatement
Sector Participation in Labour Supply Models: Preferences or
Rationing?No. Author(s)
9367 H.G. Blocmen and
A. Kapteyn
9368 M.R. Baye, D. Kovenock
and C.G. de Vries
9369 T.van de Klundert and
S. Smuldcrs









9375 E. van Damme
9376 P.M. Kort
9377 A. L. Bovenberg
and F. van der Ploeg
9378 F. Thuijsman, B. Peleg,
M. Amitai 8c A. Shmida




9381 F. de Jong
9401 1.P.C Kleijnen and
R.Y. Rubinstein




The Estimation of Utility Consistent Labor Supply Models by
Means of Simulated Scores
The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R~ 2:
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates
The Welfare Consequencesof Different RegimesofOligopolistic
Competition in a Growing Economy with Firm-Specific
Knowlcdge
Intersection Theorems on the Simplotope
Altemating-Move Preplays and vN - M Stable Sets in Two
Person Strategic Form Games
Voters' Power in Indirect Voting Systems with Political Parties:
the Square Root Effect
Pollution Abatement and Long-term Growth
Marginal Equivalence in v-Spherical Models
Evolutionary Game Theory
Pollution Control and the Dynamics of Ihe Firm: the Effects of
Market Based Instruments on Optimal Firm Investments
Optimal Taxation, Public Goods and Environmental Policy with
Involuntary Unemployment
Automata, Matching and Foraging Behavior of Bees
Capital Mobility and Social Insurance in an Integrated Market
The Continuous Multivariate Location-Scale Model Revisited: A
Tale of Robustness
Specification, Solution and Estimation ofa Discrete Time Target
Zone Model of EMS Exchange Rates
Monte Carlo Sampling and Variance Reduction Techniques
Closing the Garch Gap: Continuous Time Garch Modeling
The Measurement of Household Cost Functions: Revealed
Preference Versus Subjective MeasuresNo. Author(s)
9404 H.G. Bloemen
~LII)i 1' W'..I. Dr Rijl
9-tll(r A Dc Wacgcnacrc
9407 A. van den Nouweland,
P. Borm,
W. van Golstein Brouwers,
R. Groot Bruinderink,
and S. "fijs
9408 A.L. Bovenberg and
F. van der Plceg
9409 P. Smit
9410 J. Eichberger and
D. Kelsey
941 I N. Dagan, R. Sen-anu
and O. Volij
9412 li. Bester and
E. Petrakis




9416 J.J.G. Lemmen and
S.C.W. Eijffinger
9417 J. de la Horra and
C. I:cmandcz
Ua18 D. fohnan and L. l'anc
Title
Job Search, Seazch Intensity and Labour Market Transitions: An
Empirical Exercise
Mor:ll I I;liarcl and Nuis}' Infirrnlatiun Uisclusurc
Rcdislribution ol IZisk'I~hrough Incomplctc Markcts wilh'I rading
Constraints
A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in Telecommunication
Consequences of Environmental Tax Reform for lnvoluntary
Unemployment and Welfare
Amoldi Type Methods for Eigenvalue Calculation: Theory and
Experiments
Non-additive Beliefs and Game Theory
A Non-cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules
Coupons and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination
Bayesian Efficiency Analysis with a Flcxible Form: l"he AIM
Cost Function
World Bank-Borrower Relations and Project Supervision
A Bargaining Model of Financial Intermediation
The Price Approach to Financial Integration: Decomposing
European Money Market [nterest Rate Differentials
Sensitivity to Prior Independence via Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstem
Model
A Simplicial Algorithm for Computing Propcr Nash Equilibria
of Finite GamesP.O. ~iOX 90153, 5000 LE TILBUFiU, I Ht Nt i HtHLANUS
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant
u~u~MiN~iiini~i~w~rMi~u